Economic And Social Actors In The World Trade Organization by Charnovitz, Steve
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ACTORS IN THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
Steve Charnovitz"
I. THE WTO AND ECONOMIC ACTORS ......................... 260
A. Enhancing Domestic Rights ......................... 261
B. Enforcing WTO Rules Domestically ..................... 266
C. Enforcing WTO Rules at the WTO ...................... 266
II. THE WTO AND SOCIAL ACTORS ............................ 269
1IH. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................ 270
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an international organization
composed of Members that are states or customs territories.1 Like every
international organization, the WTO connects in some ways to the individuals,
which inhabit the states. The main impact of the WTO on the individual springs
from the substantive disciplines of the trading system. For example, eliminating
quotas can change the structure of production and employment within a country.
But the WTO also has an important connection to individuals through its
procedural disciplines applying to Members, and through other means. This
article looks at the broadening rights and opportunities for natural and corporate
persons. I will survey the key issues and present some policy recommendations.
The connections between the WTO and private actors can be divided into two
types: those with economic actors and those with social actors. Economic
actors pursue their self-interest. Such actors include exporters, importers,
producers, merchants, and workers.2 They may be individuals, companies,
corporations, trade associations, or labor unions. Social actors pursue their
visions of the public interest. These actors are multifarious. A typical actor is
the non-governmental organization (NGO), but social actors can be religious
leaders, academics, and scientists. Business associations and labor unions can
also be social actors, whether or not one counts them as an NGO. A social actor
need not be a group; an individual can be a social actor.
* Attorney, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering. The views expressed are those of the author. Support
for this research was provided by the Ford Foundation through the Global Environment & Trade Study.
1. See generally Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
arts. XI-XII, reprinted in World Trade Organization, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Cambridge University Press, 1999), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-elegal.e/final-e.htm [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
2. Governments can also be economic actors - for example, state trading entities.
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Admittedly, this typology is fuzzy. The pursuit of self-interest cannot be
disentangled from the pursuit of public interest. Social actors can act with
economic motives and economic actors can act with social motives.
Nonetheless, the distinction is a useful one. When a person lodges a
complaint about the way an agency deals with him, he is performing a different
function than when he offers a prescription for how a law should be changed.
In my view, the social actor is distinguished from the economic actor by the
nature of the activism rather than the identity of the actor. Thus, a nonprofit
business association can act in both ways. It can act narrowly as an economic
actor and also broadly as a social actor.
My presentation has three parts. Part I looks at the interaction between the
WTO and economic actors. A much shorter Part Il looks at the interaction
between the WTO and social actors. Part III analyzes both relationships briefly
and presents a few recommendations for new WTO policies.
I. THE WTO AND ECONOMIC ACTORS
The WTO agreements are a code of obligations and rights for member
governments.3 None of these obligations apply directly to individual actors.
With one exception, no rights exist for economic actors within the WTO. Yet
as we will see, the rights and obligations apply to economic actors indirectly.
Many economic actors do very well by the WTO. The biggest gain from
the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations (1986-94) came in the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The TRIPS
Agreement requires each member government to award private rights to
individual "right holders" from other countries. TRIPS specifies a broad range
of such rights embracing copyrights, trademarks, geographical indications, and
patents. These are substantive rights that are forcing changes in every country's
law. Another big gain for economic actors emerged in the General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS). The GATS requires governments to grant non-
3. See, e.g., Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art.
3.2, reprinted in World Trade Organization, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Cambridge University Press, 1999), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/egal-efinal_e.htm [hereinafter DSU Agreement]. This Agreement states
that recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body cannot add to or diminish the "rights and
obligations" provided in the covered agreements. The WTO agreements do not explicitly specify these
"rights." Id.
4. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 1.3, reprinted in World
Trade Organization, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS (Cambridge University Press. 1999), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_et
inal_e.htm [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. See also id. art. 8.2. The drafters anticipated that these rights
would also be granted to nationals because it would be politically difficult for a government to give greater
rights to aliens than to citizens.
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discriminatory treatment to "service suppliers" of other WTO member
countries.5
The innovator and service provider do not acquire these substantive rights
directly from the WTO, but rather from governments via the implementation of
their WTO obligations. Thus, if the promise is not fulfilled, an economic actor
does not have a cause of action at the WTO. Its only recourse would be to
petition the government denying the right, or lobby its own government for
diplomatic protection.6
Some WTO agreements transmit obligations indirectly to economic actors.
For example, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement requires
governments to "take such reasonable measures as may be available to them to
ensure that non-governmental entities within their territories" comply with the
SPS Agreement.7 The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) also
conveys indirect obligations. It requires governments to take such reasonable
measures as may be available to them to ensure that non-governmental bodies
comply with certain TBT rules.8 In addition, the TBT Agreement sets up a
Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption, and Application of
Standards.9 Governments are directed to "take such reasonable measures as
may be available to them to ensure that local government and non-governmental
standardizing bodies.., accept and comply with this Code of Good Practice."''
A. Enhancing Domestic Rights
To assist economic actors in gaining the benefits of the WTO Agreement,
governments established numerous procedural and administrative requirements
5. General Agreement on Trade in Services, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral
Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15,
1994, 33 LLM. 1125, Annex 1B, art. 1: I [hereinafter GATS Agreement].
6. JOHN JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 103-04 (1992).
7. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, art. 13, reprinted in
World Trade Organization, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Cambridge University Press, 1999), available at http:/www.wto.orgenglish/docs--e
legale/final.e.htm [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
8. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, art. 3. 1, reprinted in World Trade Organization, THE
LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Cambridge
University Press, 1999), available at http:/www.wto.orglenglish/docs_etlegale/final-e.htm [hereinafter TBT
Agreement]. See also id., art. 8.1 & Annex 1, 18. These non-governmental bodies might also be viewed as
social actors.
9. Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption, and Application of Standards, TBT
Agreement, Annex 3, reprinted in World Trade Organization, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Cambridge University Press, 1999), available
at http:/www.wto.org/english/docse/legaelfinal_e.htm [hereinafter TBT Code of Good Practice].
10. Id. at art. 4. See also id. at art. 8; id. at art. 14.4 (discussing procedures for conformity
assessment by non-governmental bodies and dispute settlement).
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to be met within member countries. These rules are sometimes referred to as
"transparency," but they are broader than that term suggests. They are due
process obligations giving an economic actor the right to submit comments to
agencies and to appeal rulings.
The idea of using a trade treaty to mandate procedural economic rights did
not originate in the Uruguay Round." It was always part of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), written in 1947. For example, GATT
Article X:3(b) requires each party to maintain "judicial, arbitral or
administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter alia, of the prompt
review and correction of administrative action relating to customs matters," and
further requires such tribunals to be independent of the administering agency.'
2
Another provision in GATT Article X calls for the prompt publication of trade
regulations in order to enable both governments and "traders" to become
acquainted with them.'3
Recently, GATT Article X was the subject of a landmark WTO panel
decision in the Argentina Bovine Hides case.14 The panel found that Argentina
was violating GATT Article X:3(a), which requires governments to administer
trade regulations in a "uniform, impartial, and reasonable manner .... ", At
issue was a regulation that permitted two domestic leather and tanning trade
associations to observe Customs agency inspections wherein products are
classified for an export tax assessment." The plaintiff European Communities
(EC) called this regulation a violation of GATT Article X because the presence
of the trade associations inhibited the export of raw hides.'7 One problem was
that the export procedures gave downstream slaughterhouses access to
confidential business information. The WTO panel was called upon to interpret
GATT Article X provisions which, surprisingly, had not received much
attention during the previous five decades.' 8 Noting that Article X uses the
1I. The principle goes back at least as early as 1923 with the International Convention relating to
the Simplification of Customs Formalities, Nov. 3, 1923, 30 L.N.T.S. 373. Article 4 of the Convention directs
parties to publish customs regulations in such a manner as to enable "persons concerned" to become
acquainted with them "and to avoid the prejudice which might result from the application of customs
formalities of which they are ignorant." Id. Article 5 directs parties to enable "traders" to procure official
information in regard to customs tariffs. Id.
12. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, art. X:3(b)
[hereinafter GAT']. The GATT is now incorporated and updated in the WTO Agreement, Annex IA.
13. Id. at art. X: 1.
14. Argentina - Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished Leather,
Report of the Panel, Dec. 19, 2000, WT/DS 155/R (hereinafter Argentina Bovine Hides Report].
15. Id. 11.101, 12.2.
16. Id. '2.30-2.31, 2.39.
17. Id. 11.22, 11.36, 11.87, 11.89, 11.95.
18. WTO, GUIDEToGAT ILAW ANDPRAcrICE 294-98 (World Trade Organization ed., 1995). The
issue of GATTI Article X arose in a few WTO cases, but no violations were found. In the United States Cotton
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terms "traders" and "importer," the panel held that the Article X discipline
requires more than treating all governments the same. 9 After considering what
information the trade associations were gaining access to, the panel held that
Argentina's regulation was not being administered in an impartial and
reasonable manner." The implication of the holding is that Argentina is being
unreasonable to its exporters, who may suffer injury from the presence (during
inspections) of private actors with competitive economic interests. 2' Although
the panel does not vindicate the due process right of the exporter directly, its
holding for the EC is centered on a finding that Argentina is disadvantaging its
domestic economic actors.
The advance in jurisprudence in this case is subtle, and so let me clarify it.
Every WTO dispute has private actors lurking behind it.22 Nevertheless, the
typical dispute is couched in state-centric terms-that is, the claim is that one
government is failing to fulfill the WTO obligations it owes to another.
Argentina Bovine Hides can be viewed in that normal way too. Yet the panel
could only reach its legal conclusion by finding that the Government of
Argentina was being unreasonable to someone, and in this case, it was to its
exporters. In most WTO disputes in which a victim appears in the story, that
victim resides in the plaintiff country. This case is different because the EC
exercises its GATT cause of action against Argentina for, in effect, victimizing
a domestic economic actor in Argentina.
In requiring parties to accord limited procedural rights to economic actors,
the original GATT laid the foundation for the broader rights now championed
in WTO agreements. Like the GATT, the WTO does not accord rights directly
to individuals, but rather mandates that member governments do so. Although
case, the Appellate Body noted that an essential implication of Article X:2 is that "Members and other persons
affected, or likely to be affected, by govenmental measures imposing restraints, requirements and other
burdens, should have a reasonable opportunity to acquire authentic information about such measures and
accordingly to protect and adjust their activities or alternatively to seek modification of such measures."
United States - Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre Underwear, Report of the Appellate
Body, Feb. 25, 1997, WT/DS24/AB/R, 16.3. In the EC Bananas case, the panel found a violation of GATT
Article X:3(a), but this finding was reversed by the Appellate Body. European Communities - Regime for
the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Report of the Appellate Body, Sept. 25, 1997, Ift 199-201.
In the EC Poultry case, the Appellate Body upheld the decision of the panel dismissing Brazil's Article X
claims on their merits. European Communities - Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain Poultry
Products, Report of the Appellate Body, July 13, 1998, WT/DS69/ABIR, II 109-16. In the Shrimp-Turtle
case, the Appellate Body used GATT Article X:3 to interpret the chapeau of GATT Article XX. United States
- Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body, Oct. 12, 1998,
WT/DS58/AB/R, " 182-83.
19. Argentina Bovine Hides Report, supra note 14, '1 11.67-11.68.
20. Id. 'fl 11.91, 11.94, 11. 100.
21. Id. "1 11.93, 11.98.
22. Jeffrey L Dunoff, The Misguided Debate Over NGO Participation at the WTO, I J. INT'L ECON.
L 432,441-51 (1998).
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a few commentators have pointed to this important legal development-most
notably the perspicacious Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann-this dimension of WTO
law has often been left to the specialists for each trade agreement.2
In at least three WTO agreements, the guarantee of individual economic
rights is central. Consider the agreements on antidumping, subsidies, and
intellectual property. The Antidumping Agreement requires governments: (1)
to initiate antidumping investigations upon an application by (and on behalf of)
a domestic industry; (2) to give all interested parties notice and an ample
opportunity to present evidence and to defend their interests; (3) to give public
notice upon initiating an investigation; (4) to provide judicial review of
antidumping decisions; and (5) to give interested parties the right to seek review
of the continued need for an antidumping duty, and to terminate the duty if no
longer needed.2' The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(SCM) contains analogous provisions regarding countervailing duties. 5 Part III
of the TRIPS Agreement assigns to governments numerous procedural
obligations toward the holder of private rights.' For example, governments
must enable an individual right holder to institute administrative or judicial
proceedings to block the importation of a good lacking an authentic trademark
or copyright."' In effect, TRIPS defines illicit trade and commits governments
to ban it at the behest of an economic actor.
The attention to economic actors is less central in other WTO agreements,
but still very important. Consider the agreements on services (GATS),
safeguards, customs valuation, rules of origin, and TBT. The GATS requires
governments to maintain "judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or
procedures which provide, at the request of an affected service supplier, for the
prompt review of, and where justified, appropriate remedies for, administrative
23. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Trade Law and the GATTWTO Dispute Settlement
System 1948-1996: An Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw AND THE GATr/WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEmENT SYSTEM 3, 19, 60, 72-74, 108-15, 119 (Petersmann ed., 1997). Two other WTO Secretariat
staffers provide a sophisticated discussion of these developments too. Gabrielle Marceau & Peter N. Pedersen,
Is the WTO Open and Transparent?, 33 J. WORLD TRADE, Feb. 1999, at5, 21-32, 37-43.
24. See generally Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994, arts. 5.1,5.4, 6.1, 6.2, 8, 11.2, 12, 13 reprinted in World Trade Organization, THE LEGAL
TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Cambridge
University Press, 1999), available at http:/www.wto.orglenglish/docs-e/legalefinaLe.htm (hereinafter
Antidumping Agreement]. Interested parties include the foreign exporter or producer. Id. at art. 6.11.
25. See generally Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, arts. 1], 12, 21, 22, 23,
reprinted in World Trade Organization, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Cambridge University Press, 1999), available at
http:/www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/final_e.htm [hereinafter SCM Agreement].
26. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, at arts. 41-62.
27. ld. at art. 51.
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decisions affecting trade in services. ' 28 The GATS also requires governments
to work in cooperation with relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental
organizations towards the adoption of common international standards for
qualifications of service providers.29 The Safeguards Agreement requires
governments, when commencing a safeguard investigation, to give public notice
and to hold hearings in which importers, exporters and other interested parties
can provide evidence and respond to the presentations of other parties."0 The
Customs Valuation Agreement requires governments to establish in law the
right of the importer to appeal a determination of customs value.3 An appeal
must lie to ajudicial authority and be without penalty. The Agreement on Rules
of Origin provides that an exporter or importer may ask a government for a
determination of the origin of a good.32 This is to be provided as soon as
possible but no later than 150 days. The TBT Code of Good Practice calls for
a sixty-day comment period on new standards by "interested parties."33 The
standardizing body is directed to "take into account" the comments, and to reply
if requested.3
In a lecture to the American Society of International Law in 2000, Anne-
Marie Slaughter presented a "liberal theory of international law" in which she
contended that the "primary function of international law is not to create
international institutions to perform functions that individual states cannot
perform by themselves, but rather to influence and improve the functioning of
domestic institutions."'35 Professor Slaughter does not point to the WTO as an
example of such a function, but it would seem to fit her liberal theory. By
installing new due process requirements, the WTO enhances the domestic rule
of law. Governments become more accountable to domestic and foreign
economic actors.
28. GATS Agreement, supra note 5, at art. VI:2(a).
29. Id. at art. V 11:5.
30. Agreement on Safeguards, art. 3.1, reprinted in World Trade Organization, THE LEGAL TEXTS:
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Cambridge University
Press, 1999), available at http:/www.wto.orglenglish/docs_elegal.e/finaLe.htm.
31. Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994, arts. 11.1-11.2, reprinted in World Trade Organization, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Cambridge University Press, 1999), available
at http:/www.wto.org/engish/docs_/legaLe/finaLe.htm GA7f Article VU:5 provides that the methods for
determining value should be "given sufficient publicity to enable traders to estimate, with a reasonable degree
of certainty, the value for customs purposes."
32. Agreement on Rules of Origin, arts. 2(h), 3(F), reprinted in World Trade Organization, THE
LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OFTHE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (Cambridge
University Press, 1999), available at http:/www.wto.orgtenglish/dcs-elegal-e/final_e.htm.
33. TBT Code of Good practice, supra note 9, L.
34. Id. I N.
35. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 ASILPROC. 240, 246 (2000).
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B. Enforcing WTO Rules Domestically
The WTO sets rules for governments, but does not require governments to
allow private actors to enforce WTO obligations in domestic courts.36 To my
knowledge, no government does so. Professor Petersmann has been a tireless
advocate of strengthening trade rules by allowing adversely affected citizens to
invoke and enforce GATT/WTO guarantees in domestic courts.37 Meinhard
Hilf is another scholar who promotes such a reform. He points out that
"domestic courts would offer the best guarantee of protection of interests and
rights of individual operators, thus making the entire GATT system more
effective."3 In July 2000, the International Law Association Committee on
International Trade Law recommended that WTO Members:
strengthen the legal and judicial remedies of their citizens and
residents (natural and legal) if the latter are adversely affected by
violations of precise and unconditional WTO guarantees of freedom
and non-discrimination, especially where such violation of WTO
rules has been ascertained in a legally binding manner by rulings of
the [WTO Dispute Settlement Body] DSB.39
C. Enforcing WTO Rules at the WTO
Another way to strengthen the rule of WTO law would be to allow
economic actors to invoke WTO dispute settlement on their own. Several
commentators have advocated this approach.' At present few, if any, WTO
Members would feel confident enough about their record of implementation to
subject themselves to this new source of criticism.
36. Petersmann, supra note 23, at 120.
37. See, e.g., Ernst-Uhich Petersmann, National Constitutions, Foreign Trade Policy and European
Community Law, 3 EUR. J. INT'L L1, 35 (1992).
38. Meinhard Hilf, The Role ofNational Courts in International Trade Relations, in INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETrLEMENT, supra note 23, at 559, 579. For an excellent survey
of the issue of direct effect and the WTO, see Thomas Cottier & Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, The
Relationship Between World Trade Organization Law, National and Regional Law, I J. INT'L ECON. L 83,
92-122 (1988).
39. Res. 2/2000, Committee on International Trade Law, International Law Association, 69th
Conference, Report of the Sixty Ninth Conference 2000, at Annex 3 Recommendation 4 (2000),
http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/REStrade.pdf.
40. See. e.g., Martin Lukas, The Role of Private Parties in the Enforcement of the Uruguay Round
Agreements, 29 J. WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1995, at 181, 191, 202-06; Glen T. Schleyer, Power to the People:
Allowing Private Parties to Raise Claims Before the WTO Dispute Resolution System, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
2275 (1997); Andrea K. Schneider, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Individual Rights in International
Trade Organizations, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L 587,627-30, 638 (1998).
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The closest the WTO gets to private invocation is the Agreement on
Preshipment Inspection (PSI), which is the exception referred to at the
beginning of Part I. Preshipment inspection verifies the quality, quantity, price,
and customs classification of goods. Some governments mandate that goods be
inspected before shipment. The Agreement on Preshipment Inspection obligates
those governments to require the inspection entity to make available a grievance
procedure for exporters.4 ' Then, two working days after such a grievance is
lodged, either the exporter or the inspector may refer the dispute for review by
an "Independent Entity.-4 2 The WTO established the Independent Entity in
1995, in conjunction with the International Federation of Inspection Agencies
and the International Chamber of Commerce.43 If such referrals occur, the
Independent Entity will set up an arbitral panel whose decisions are binding on
the exporter and inspector." The role of the panel is to decide whether the
parties have complied with the PSI Agreement.'
This review procedure gives an economic actor-the exporter-a
procedural right of action under WTO rules. The exporter's claim would be that
the agent of the importing government (i.e., the preshipment inspector) is
violating the PSI Agreement. The WTO member government in the country of
intended importation is one step removed from being a party to the dispute.
The arbitrations under the Independent Entity are separate from the
arbitrations (or adjudications) carried out through the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB). The DSB considers only disputes between WTO member
governments. Nevertheless, some WTO panels have looked through the
governmental veil to see the economic actors who are the real stakeholders in
the dispute.
The leading case is United States Section 301. The panel held that a
controversial United States trade law did not violate WTO rules.' 6 In reaching
that decision in 1999, the panel explained that:
41. Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results
of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.LM. 1125, Annex IA, art. 2 [hereinafter
PSI Agreement].
42. ld. at art. 4.
43. Press Release, WTO, Operation of the Independent Entity Established under Article 4 of the
Agreement on Preshipment Inspection (Feb. 9, 1996) (on file with author). The PSI Agreement states that the
Independent Entity will be constituted jointly by an organization representing preshipment inspection entities
and an organization representing exporters. The IFIA and the ICC were quickly identified as those
organizations, but they were not willing to constitute the new Entity on their own without exemption from
legal liability. Therefore, the Independent Entity was set up by the WTO.
44. PSI Agreement, supra note 41, at art. 4(h).
45. Id. at art. 4(0.
46, Sections 301-3 10 of the Trade Act of 1974, Report of the Panel, Dec. 22, 1999, WTIDS 152/R.
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[T]he GATT/WTO did not create a new legal order the subjects of
which comprise both contracting parties or Members and their
nationals. However, it would be entirely wrong to consider that the
position of individuals is of no relevance to the GATT/WTO legal
matrix. Many of the benefits to Members which are meant to flow as
a result of the acceptance of various disciplines under the
GATT/WTO depend on the activity of individual economic operators
in the national and global market places. The purpose of many of
these disciplines, indeed one of the primary objects of the
GATT/WTO as a whole, is to produce certain market conditions
which would allow this individual activity to flourish .... The
multilateral trading system is, per force, composed not only of States
but also, indeed mostly, of individual economic operators.'
In line with the panel's reasoning, one can view economic actors as the
beneficiary of the WTO contract. The trading system will build on this insight
in the future, as economic operators push governments to comply with their
WTO obligations.
The lack of formal procedures for economic actors to participate in WTO
dispute settlement has led to pressures to permit amicus curiae briefs. At the
compliance stage of the Australia Salmon dispute, the "Article 21.5" panel
accepted a brief from the Concerned Fishermen and Processors in South
Australia, but did not discuss the brief in finding continuing violations by
Australia.48 (The decision went against the interests of the Concerned
Fishermen.) In the United States Hot-Rolled Lead dispute, the Appellate Body
accepted briefs from two trade associations, but then declared that it did not find
it necessary to take their briefs into account.49 As of December 2000, the state
of WTO law is that non-governmental persons do not have the right to submit
an amicus curiae brief to a panel, although they may try to do so.
The lack of a right to intervene as an interested third party or to submit an
amicus brief was most glaringly absent in the Australia Leather case. In that
WTO dispute, the United States government was successful in characterizing
an Australian government grant to the leather producer Howe and Company as
47. Id. U 7.72, 7.73, 7.76.
48. Australia - Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon - Recourse to Article 21.5 by Canada,
Report of the Panel, Feb. 18, 2000, WT/DS I8/RW, '17.8. DSU Article 21.5 permits the plaintiff government
to ask that a panel be convened to review whether the defendant government has complied with the
recommendations of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.
49. United States - Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth
Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, Report of the Appellate Body, May 10, 2000,
WTIDSi38/AB/R, 1 42. The Appellate Body held that it had the legal authority to accept the briefs. It did
not actually say that it had "accepted" the briefs, but implied that it had in declaring that it did not find it
necessary to take the briefs into account.
268
Chamovitz
a prohibited export subsidy, in violation of the SCM Agreement.50 The panel
did not give Howe any opportunity to argue that the grant was not an export
subsidy. That incapacity is not unusual. The WTO has adjudicated several
export subsidy cases all of which have stakeholders who are not heard from in
the proceedings. What was unusual, and troubling, in the Leather case was
Howe's absence during the compliance review proceedings. The "Article 21.5"
panel ruled that Australia had failed to comply because it had not required Howe
to repay the subsidy to the government.5 This was the first time any GATT or
WTO panel issued a judgment that would require a private actor to pay money
to a government.52 Given the important precedent being set in this case, which
might be characterized as a WTO-required expropriation, it was unfortunate that
the panel did not offer Howe a right to reply. The DSU gives every panel the
authority to seek information from any individual or body that the panel deems
appropriate. 3
In summary, notwithstanding its state-centric nature, the WTO interacts
with private economic actors in significant ways. In TRIPS and GATS,
governments are mandated to treat economic actors according to substantive
rules. In several WTO agreements, governments are mandated to accord private
actors various procedural rights. In the PSI Agreement, the exporter can avail
itself of arbitration at the WTO. All of these advances are important. Yet in
many other areas, economic actors are still excluded from WTO law and
implementation.
II. THE WTO AND SOCIAL ACTORS
The status of social actors at the WTO is better in some ways than the
status economic actors enjoy, but worse in most others. It is better because the
WTO Agreement permits direct involvement by NGOs in WTO affairs. It is
worse in that social actors did not achieve the gains that economic actors did in
the Uruguay Round.
Constitutionally, the WTO can be open to social actors. The WTO
Agreement (Article V: 2) says that "The General Council may make
appropriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-
governmental organizations concerned with matters related to those of the
50. Australia - Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive Leather, Report of the
Panel, May 25, 1999, WT/DS 126/R.
5I. Australia - Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive Leather, Recourse to
Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, Report of the Panel, Jan. 21, 2000, WT/DSI26/RW, I 6.48.
52. There were GATI' cases in which the government was directed to repay an antidumping duty
erroneously collected from an importer, but there the private actor was being compensated. See Petersmann,
supra note 23, at 42-43. In Leather, the assets of the private actor were to be confiscated.
53. DSU Agreement, supra note 3, at art. 13.1.
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WTO. ''54 This provision was implemented in 1996 by the General Council, but
its Guidelines provide for only very shallow participation by NGOs.5 The main
consultation so far has been a series of symposia organized by the WTO
Secretariat at which selected NGOs were invited to speak. NGOs are also able
to seek accreditation to attend WTO Ministerial Conferences as observers.
About 915 NGOs did so and attended the Seattle Ministerial in 1999.
The WTO has several councils, committees, and bodies, but social actors
are not allowed to participate in them. Thus, the TRIPS Council does not
consult medical NGOs concerned about drug patenting; the Committee on
Agriculture does not consult farm NGOs concerned about food security; and the
Textiles Monitoring Body does not consult development NGOs concerned about
continued protectionism in textiles. In the DSB, the opportunities for social
actors as a friend of the court are about the same as for private actors-that is,
very limited to nil. Even the WTO Trade Policy Review Mechanism, which
appraises government trade policies, does not solicit input from social actors.
Social actors do have one advantage over private actors however. Most
private actors cannot apply for accreditation to attend WTO Ministerial
Conferences. Thus, exporters, importers, and service suppliers cannot apply,
although associations of these private actors can apply (and do).
Although most of the WTO provisions that mandate procedural rights at
the national level pertain only to economic actors, there are two instances where
such rights pertain to social actors. These are in the Antidumping and SCM
agreements. The Antidumping Agreement directs governments to give
interested parties the right to participate in domestic antidumping proceedings,
and states that when the target product is commonly sold at the retail level,
"representative consumer organizations" shall have an opportunity to provide
information relevant to the ascertainment of dumping, injury, and causality.56
SCM has a similar provision with respect to subsidization, injury, and
causality." While it is possible to characterize consumer NGOs as economic
actors, they are better conceived as social actors because the interest of the
consumer is a general interest, not a special interest.
m11. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Even with its fuzziness, the distinction between economic and social actors
is helpful in showing how WTO law weaves in non-state actors. The economic
actors got new rights as market participants. The social actors got a special door
54. WTO Agreement, supra note 1, at art. V.2.
55. Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations, July 18,1996,
WT/L/162 [hereinafter NGO Guidelines].
56. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 24, at art. 6.12.
57. SCM Agreement, supra note 25, at art. 12.10.
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to the WTO, but the door is almost always closed. So one might say that the
WTO is more solicitous of homo economicus than homo politicus.
But that is too simplistic an explanation. The economic actors obtained
more from the Uruguay Round because they were better organized and asked
for more. In asking for more responsive administrative procedures at the
national level, the economic actors aligned themselves with an existing norm of
the GATT system (i.e., Article X). Social actors could follow this same track
in the next trade round. Strengthening due process for social actors could be
justified as a WTO goal because regulatory procedures that provide for public
participation may be more stable and less susceptible to special interest
influence. Consider the following example: The SPS Agreement calls for the
harmonization of standards and the acceptance of foreign standards as
equivalent in certain circumstances.58 These goals are more likely to be
achieved when each government has a fair, inclusive standard-setting procedure
that allows economic and social actors to participate. Presently, the
transparency provisions in the SPS Agreement apply only to state actors.59
When one looks at the international level, economic actors are no better
positioned for influencing WTO results than are social actors. Both lack formal
opportunities to participate. With respect to the WTO's legislative and
executive functions, the case for participation by social actors seems stronger
than for economic actors. That's because as an international agency, the WTO
should be more open to hearing assertions of public interest than individual
interest. With respect to the WTO's judicial functions, the prospect of giving
private groups a right of action seems remote. If that were to occur, economic
and social actors should have an equal right to participate after qualifying for
standing. As amici, economic and social actors should have similar access.
NGO participation is being debated at the WTO, but most governments
resist opening the doors.60 Such exclusivity is justified on the grounds that
government actors are the only legitimate participants in the WTO.
Governments are elected by "The People," while NGOs are merely selected by
their members. The fact that the WTO does not require its Member
Governments to be democratic (and many are not) is considered too
undiplomatic to mention in WTO debate.
The claim that an individual may lack legitimacy to speak is an
authoritarian idea. The right of an individual to speak for oneself, to form
associations, and to petition government is a natural right that undergirds
democracy. To suggest that when governments meet together to bargain, social
58. See SPS Agreement, supra note 7, at arts. 3.1, 4.1.
59. See Id. at Annex B, art. 7 (Transparency of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations).
60. Daniel C. Esty, Linkages and Governance: NGOs at the World Trade Organization, 19 U. PA.
J. INT'L ECON. L. 709 (1998).
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actors consequently lose their voice is both illogical and anti-democratic. The
creation of an international organization cannot deprive individuals of their
voice to the governments that run the organization. Indeed, the personality of
an international organization includes being open to some extent to public input.
In 1945, the drafters of the United Nations Charter recognized this truism
when they wrote Article 71 which provides that the Economic and Social
Council "may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-
governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its
competence."'" Some commentators view Article 71 as enshrining a new
principle of law. But in my view, Article 71 was merely reflective of customary
international law-namely, that in establishing international organizations with
legislative or executive functions, governments have an obligation to provide
a channel for NGOs.62
The continued influence of state-centrism among the delegates to the WTO
is understandable. These delegates work for governments. Furthermore, they
may prefer not having to compete intellectually with non-government actors.
What is surprising, though, is how state-centrism continues to distort the
thinking of academics and even social actors. Let me give two recent examples.
In September 2000, a group of academics sent a letter to 535 college presidents
criticizing the "Anti-Sweatshop" campaigns on college campuses. The letter
states: "Little attention has been given to whether the views of the Anti-
Sweatshop campaign are representative of the views of governments, non-
government organizations and workers in the poor countries."63 But why should
it matter whether the anti-sweatshop campaigners are representing the views of
developing country governments who are tolerating, if not promoting, the
sweatshops? (The professors' point about foreign NGOs and workers has
merit.) In December 2000, the United States labor federation (the AFL-CIO)
wrote the Office of the United States Trade Representative to offer views on the
ongoing United States negotiations with Singapore for a free trade agreement.
The AFL-CIO opposed inclusion of an investor-to-state dispute resolution
system, explaining that "Investors ought not to be able to bypass their own
governments to determine when a dispute merits international arbitration .... 964
To hear such a constipated view from the AFL-CIO is particularly startling
given the longtime role of the American labor movement in championing
61. Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18
MICH. J. INT'L L. 183, 250-52 (1997).
62. The other institutions considered in this panel session, the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund, are not really contrary practice because when they were set up in 1944, they were conceived
as financial institutions. Today, both the Bank and the Fund are more open to NGO input than is the WTO.
63. Nancy Dunne, Professors take on campus protestors, FIN. TiMES, Oct. 4, 2000, at 12.
64. AFL-CIO Comments on U.S. - Singapore FTA, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 22, 2000, at 16.
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opportunities for NGOs to bypass their governments in international
organizations.
Change will come to the WTO. If I may offer a prediction, I think that
social and economic actors will gain significant participatory rights at the WTO
within the next decade. Both NGOs and the private sector are far better
positioned to influence the trading system in 2000 than they were in 1990.
Furthermore, the trends inducing that change will continue. The most important
trends are the increase in international transactions and the widening of W'TO
law. Each new WTO agreement brings new private actors into the trading
system, all asking the same initial questions as to how they can participate.
Eventually, the resistance of the WTO to greater cooperation and consultation
with NGOs will melt away.
In closing, let me offer three suggestions for what can be done to improve
the interface between the WTO and the private and non-profit sectors. First, we
ought to begin thinking about an Optional Protocol for the WTO wherein parties
would agree to WTO jurisdiction for disputes lodged by private actors. 65 A
minimum number of governments would be required to ratify the accord. One
might wonder why any government would ratify. The answer is the same as for
analogous protocols in human rights treaties. Governments do so to
demonstrate and lock in their commitment to international rules.
A second suggestion is that the WTO negotiate an Agreement on Public
Participation in National Trade Policymaking." This idea follows from the
statement in the WTO's NGO Guidelines: "Closer consultation and cooperation
with NGOs can also be met constructively through appropriate processes at the
national level where lies primary responsibility for taking into account the
different elements of public interest which are brought to bear on trade policy-
making." 67
In drafting such a Protocol, inspiration could be drawn from the 1976
Tripartite Consultation Convention (No. 144) of the International Labor
Organization and the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters." One might also recall the recommendation by the GATT's Leutwiler
Group (in 1985) that governments consider setting up "advisory groups made
65. The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding permits using WTO dispute settlement for
"plurilateral" agreements, which apply to parties inter se. DSU Agreement, supra note 3, at art. 2.1.
66. See Christophe Bellmann & Richard Gerster, Accountability in the World Trade Organization,
30 J. WORLD TRADE, Dec. 1996, at 31,41-62.
67. NGO Guidelines, supra note 55, 16.
68. Convention Concerning Tripartite Consultations to Promote the Implementation of International
Labour Standards, June 21, 1976, 1089 U.N.T.S. 354; Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, arts. 6-8.
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up of influential and active representatives of the main stakeholders in
international trade-business, finance, labour, and consumers." 9
My final suggestion is that the WTO set out a place on its website to solicit
comments from the public on pending decisions, declarations, and agreements.
Eventually, there should be one website posting such notices for all international
organizations-in other words, a global "Federal Register." So far, however,
only a few international organizations regularly seek public comment, such as
the World Bank and the North American Commission on Environmental
Cooperation. That will surely change early in the 21 st century.
69. GAT, TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETTER FrURE 37 (1985). Today more stakeholders would be
acknowledged.
